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Tabula Rasa: Shelley's 
Metaphor of the Mind 
THOMAS A . R E I S N E R 
WH E N Shelley, in a much-quoted passage of A De-fence of Poetry, likened man to "an instrument over which a series of external and internal im-
pressions are driven, like the alternations of an ever-chang-
ing wind over an Aeolian lyre," 1 he was consciously seeking 
the safe middle ground between two antithetical theories 
of cognition. The analogue of the wind-harp (as M . H . 
Abrams has shown,2 a critical commonplace with the Ro-
mantics) afforded Shelley a commodious means of affirm-
ing at once the sensationalism of Locke and the intuition-
alism of Descartes and Leibnitz. Through its use, the 
patent contradiction between two conflicting epistemolo-
gies could be circumvented, if not logically reconciled, and 
the simultaneous participation of both object and subject 
in the cognitive process — the very solution propounded 
by Kant 3 — plausibly argued. 
There was good reason for Shelley to seek a compromise 
between the two schools, for though his own beliefs had 
inclined him in both directions at different times, he made 
no final commitment to either. The scientific materialism 
of Holbach ("a seducing system to young and superficial 
minds," he would later confess in his essay On Life4) had 
left him permanently dissatisfied, with a deepening sense 
that perceptible things were the shadows, not the stuff, of 
reality. "I may not be able to adduce proofs," he declared 
in a letter to Hogg, in 1811, "but I think that the leaf of 
a tree, the meanest insect on which we trample, are, in 
themselves, arguments more conclusive than any which 
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can be advanced, that some vast intellect animates infi-
nity." 5 For an empirico-materialist such as Shelley fancied 
himself at the time, the admission must have been humb-
ling indeed; only a few months later he would take Eliza-
beth Hitchener to task for voicing similar unscientific 
opinions: 
Locke proves that there are no innate ideas, that in 
consequence, there can be no innate speculative or prac-
tical principles, thus overturning all appeals of feeling 
in favor of Deity, since that feeling must be referable 
to some origin. . . . Since al l ideas are derived from 
the senses, this feeling must have originated f rom some 
sensual excitation, consequently the possessor of it may 
be aware of the time, of the circumstances, attending its 
commencement . . . Locke proves this by induction too 
clear to admit of rational objection." 
Despite the seeming self-assurance of Shelley, here at his 
best magisterial style, doubts continued to prey on his mind. 
Less than one week after chiding Miss Hitchener for re-
lapsing into orthodoxy, he wrote to Hogg in a mood of 
desperate candour: "Alas! Where is virtue? Where is 
perfection? Where I cannot reach. Is there another ex-
istence? No! Then I can never reach it. Is there another 
existence? Yes! Then I shall live there, rendering and rend-
ered happy."7 Of these momentary changes of mind Miss 
Hitchener might be blissfully unaware; yet even she must 
have wondered at Shelley's mutable views when a few short 
months after his letter commending the doctrine of Locke, 
he frankly confided: 
I have considered it in every possible light; and reason 
tells me that death is the boundary of the life of man, 
yet I feel, I believe the direct contrary. . . . The senses 
are the only inlets of knowledge, and there is an inward 
sense that had persuaded me of this . s 
What impresses the reader of Shelley's remarks is not 
the inconsistency of his opinions but his monumental inte-
grity in discerning the flaws and yet upholding the truth 
of a philosophical system founded in contradiction. None 
but a most exceptional mind could have held two irrecon-
cilable doctrines in a willing suspension of disbelief for so 
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long and at such great personal cost to itself. In the years 
that followed, the agonizing debate between sensationalism 
and intuitionalism went on in Shelley's mind, though the 
certainty of belief he sought remained, as ever, elusive. "It 
is an axiom in mental philosophy," he remarked in Specu-
lations on Metaphysics, Part I, 
that we can think of nothing which we have not per-
ceived. W h e n I say we can think of nothing, I mean, 
we can imagine nothing, we can reason of nothing, we 
can remember nothing, we can foresee nothing. The 
most astonishing combinations of poetry, the subtlest 
deductions of logic and mathematics, are no other than 
combinations which the intellect makes of sensations 
according to its own laws. A catalogue of a l l the 
thoughts of the mind, and of all their possible modifi-
cations, is a cyclopedic history of the Universe . 8 
It is odd that one who could so convincingly argue in favour 
of Locke's theories, and maintain (as Shelley did in his 
poem "On Death") that 
This world is the nurse of a l l we know, 
This world is the mother of all we f e e l , i ° 
could also, when the occasion arose, proclaim his belief in 
innate ideas. "The mind of a new-born infant," he once 
admitted to Hogg, his Oxford companion, "so far from 
being, as Locke affirms, a sheet of blank paper, is . . . a 
perfect encyclopedia, comprehending not only the newest 
discoveries, but all those still more valuable and wonderful 
inventions that will hereafter be made."1 1 If so, it is little 
wonder indeed that Cythna, imprisoned in her submarine 
cave, in The Revolt of Islam, Canto VII, can find ready 
access to all the knowledge she seeks by studying no other 
volume than this : 
'My mind became the book through which I grew 
Wise in all human wisdom, and its cave, 
W h i c h like a mine I rifled through and through, 
T o me the keeping of its secrets gave — 
One mind, the type of all, the moveless wave 
Whose calm reflects all moving things that are, 
Necessity, and love, and life, the grave, 
A n d sympathy, fountains of hope and fear; 
Justice, and truth, and time, and the world's 
natural sphere. (VII, 3100-8) 
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The conception of man's intellect as a mine ready-laden 
with innate ideas — ideas brought to consciousness by the 
senses, but neither engendered nor modified by them — was 
one of Shelley's particular debts to the mathematician and 
philosopher Leibnitz. The soul at birth, as Leibnitz ex-
plained in a treatise written in refutation of Locke, 1- was 
not of the nature of a tabula rasa on which experience 
recorded its lessons; rather, it might be compared to a 
block 1 1 of unhewn marble, within which there lay, conceal-
ed but determined, the shape of the statue. Sense-experi-
ence was merely the means of actualizing potential ideas, 
of stripping away from the indwelling form the accidental 
irrelevancies that masked it. 
So arresting an analogue of the soul could not fail, of 
course, to make an impression on Shelley, a poet already 
halfway inclined to mysticism; and two poems, the "Ode 
to Liberty" 1 4 and Epipsychidion,1^ in fact attest to his fami-
liarity with it. But what is remarkable is that Shelley, 
despite his search for an accommodation between the intu-
itionalist and the empirical view of the origin of ideas, 
should not have discerned the possibilities of a solution in 
Leibnitz. The metaphor of the German philosopher had, 
after all, admitted the agency of two contributory sources 
of knowledge — intuitive impulse and sensory stimulation 
— both of which played determining roles (however un-
equal) in the genesis of ideas. With a minimum of neces-
sary adjustment, the analogue might have served Shelley's 
need for an archetype of the cognitive process, as adequate-
ly as the Aeolian harp did in A Defence of Poetry. Yet, 
for reasons that we may never discover, he chose to make 
use not of Leibnitz, but Locke, whose tabula rasa he adapt-
ed to treat both categories of mental phenomena, those 
externally and those internally caused. 
As early as Shelley's juvenile period, his imagery shows 
a tendency to define the consciousness as an impressible 
surface — whether sand, or tablet, or book, or the like — 
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on which sensation and inspiration inscribe their lessons. 
"O Spirit!" the Fairy Queen cries, 
. . . through the sense 
B y which thy inner nature was apprised 
Of outward shows, vague dreams have rolled, 
A n d varied reminiscences have waked 
Tablets that never fade; 
A l l things have been imprinted there, 
The stars, the sea, the earth, the sky, 
E v e n the unshapeliest lineaments 
O f wild and fleeting visions 
Have left a record there 
T o testify of earth. (Queen Mab, VII, 49-59) 
Although Shelley ostensibly takes Locke's tablet for his 
analogy of the mind, his own use of it is conspicuously at 
odds with that intended by the English philosopher. If 
the latter employed the image restrictively, to ascribe all 
knowledge to the experience of the senses, Shelley himself 
repudiates this restriction: for him, inspiration no less 
than sensation plays a significant part in shaping the con-
sciousness. In doing violence to Locke's metaphor, the 
poet does not, however, lose sight of the difference ("not 
in kind, but in force") between sensory and visionary ex-
perience. The first, derived from the fixed and deter-
minate objects of the phenomenal universe, is itself bound-
ed, fixed and determinate; it is indelibly impressed on the 
mind, waking (as Shelley declares in Queen Mab) "Tablets 
that never fade." But the second, "fleeting" and "evane-
scent" in nature, "arising unforeseen and departing unbid-
den," is "elevating and delightful beyond all expression:" 1 6 
although its imprint on the mind is less permanent, it is 
more dynamic, vital and valuable. "It is," in the words 
of Shelley's Defence, 
as it were the i n t e r p é n é t r a t i o n of a diviner nature 
through our own; but its footsteps are like those of a 
wind over a sea, which the coming calm erases, and 
whose traces remain only, as on the wrinkled sand which 
paves i t . 1 7 
Distinct as they are in the poet's own mind, the two 
categories of mental impression — the sensory and fixed, 
and the extrasensory and ephemeral — are each associated 
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with a particular variant of the Lockian image of the tabula 
rasa. The consciousness stirred by the impulse of inspira-
tion, vision or dream (as in the previous passage) is con-
sistently likened to a sand-covered beach upon which the 
sweeping waves of the sea impress an ever-altering pat-
tern. Thus, in the garden of the Sensitive Plant, as "the 
day's veil fell from the world of sleep," 
. . . the beasts, and the birds, and the insects were 
drowned 
In an ocean of dreams without a sound; 
Whose waves never mark, though they ever impress 
T h e light sand which paves it, consciousness; . . . 
("The Sensitive Plant," I, 101-5) 
The delicacy of the mental impressions left behind by a 
transient inspiration is always implied, if not explicitly 
stated, as in The Revolt of Islam, where Shelley's prota-
gonists awake into a supernatural world: 
A n d is this death? — The pyre has disappeared, 
T h e Pestilence, the Tyrant , and the throng; 
T h e flames grow silent slowly there is heard 
T h e music of a breath-suspending song, 
Which , like the kiss of love when life is young, 
Steeps the faint eyes in darkness sweet and deep; 
W i t h ever-changing notes it floats along, 
T i l l on my passive soul there seemed to creep 
A melody, like waves on wrinkled sands that leap. 
(XII, 4594-602) 
The visionary analogy, compressed in this stanza into the 
space of a single line, sometimes appears in more detailed 
and elaborate form, though still in all its essentials un-
changed. Such, for example, is the amplified version we 
find in Fragments of an Unfinished Drama, where the Lady 
recounts to the Indian Youth her "half-remembered," my-
sterious dream: 
Indimi. You waked not? 
Lady. Not until my dream became 
Dike a child's legend on the tideless sand, 
W h i c h the first foam erases half, and half 
Leaves legible. (Scene II, 124-7) 
More elaborate still is Rousseau's account, in The Triumph 
of Life, of his visionary encounter with the "Shape all 
light": 
96 T H O M A S A. R E I S N E R 
'Arise and quench thy thirst, was her reply. 
A n d as a shut lily stricken by the wand 
O f dewy morning's vital alchemy, 
T rose; and, bending at her sweet command, 
Touched with faint lips the cup she raised, 
A n d suddenly my brain became as sand 
'Where the first wave had more than half erased 
T h e track of deer on desert L a b r a d o r ; 
Whilst the wolf, f rom which they fled amazed, 
'Leaves his stamp visibly upon the shore, 
Unt i l the second bursts; — so on my sight 
Burst a new vision, never seen before, 
' A n d the fa ir shape waned in the coming light, 
'More dimly than a day-appearing dream, 
The ghost of a forgotten form of sleep; . . . 
(400-12, 427-8) 
The rapidity with which dream follows dream, and inspira-
tion succeeds inspiration, wiping the surface of conscious-
ness clean and moulding its own shifting patterns upon it 
— all this is powerfully evoked by the image, in all its 
variant forms. 1 8 
By its very rationale, Shelley's distinction of two cate-
gories of mental impressions, each arising from a different 
source and differing in intensity, duration and value, evi-
dently necessitated his use of correspondingly discriminate 
metaphors. The sand-and-wave analogy of the mind, how-
ever apt it might be to describe the soul's receptivity to 
intuitive notions, was clearly not adequate to convey its 
susceptibility to sensory stimulation. What was required 
in its place was an image capable of representing at once 
the durability of the impressions acquired through the 
channels of sense, their cumulative effect on the conscious-
ness of the passive observer, the greater forcefulness of 
sensory presentations, and lastly their inferior value. With 
characteristic ingenuity, Shelley found once again the solu-
tion in Locke, in a group of images closely modelled upon 
the analogue of the tabula rasa: chronicle, register, book 
of account, and other such forms of immutable record. 
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Whatever Shelley's motives might have been for taking 
Locke's metaphor for his own, the effect of his choice was 
profoundly ironic, for it served merely to bring into focus 
his ambivalent view of empirical knowledge. As a stu-
dent of Locke and a man of his times, Shelley assumed 
almost without question, as "an axiom in mental philoso-
phy," that organic perception played a large part in the 
constitution of abstract ideas. From Wordsworth's Prelude, 
Rousseau's Emile and Locke's Some Thoughts Concerning 
Education he had learned of the crucial formative influence 
of early impressions on the infantine mind. Quite in keep-
ing with the taste of the times, he himself ventured on 
frequent, if minor, excursions into the Bildungsroman, that 
flourishing gerire of Romantic invention. In work after 
work — Alastor, "Prince Athanase," The Revolt of Islam, 
"Hymn to Intellectual Beauty" — he painstakingly detailed 
the spiritual biography of his heroes, going occasionally so 
far as to press on the reader his own poetic credentials. 
"There is an education peculiarly fitted for a Poet," he 
wrote, "without which genius and sensibility can hardly fill 
the circle of their capacities." 
T h e circumstances of my accidental education have been 
favourable to (his ambition. I have been famil iar from 
boyhood wilh mountains and lakes and the sea, and the 
solitude of forests: Danger, which sports upon the 
brink of precipices, has been m'y playmate. I have 
trodden the glaciers of the Alps , and lived under the 
eye of Mont Blanc. I have been a wanderer among dis-
tant fields. I have sailed down mighty rivers, and seen 
the sun rise and set, and the stars come forth, whilst 
I have sailed night and day down a rapid stream among 
mountains. I have seen populous cities, and have watch-
ed the passions which rise and spread, and sink and 
change, amongst assembled multitudes of men. I have 
seen the theatre of the more visible ravages of tyranny 
and war; cities and villages reduced to scattered groups 
of black and roofless houses, and the naked inhabitants 
sitting famished upon their desolated thresholds. I have 
conversed with l iv ing men of genius. The poetry of 
ancient Greece and Rome, and modern Italy, and our 
own country, has been to me, like external nature, a 
passion and an enjoyment. Such are the sources from 
which the materials for the imagery of my Poem have 
been drawn. 1 1 1 
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Indeed, experience (as Shelley believed, in harmony with 
the early Romantics) was the raw material of the adult 
sensibility, charging the nascent intellect of the child with 
its "store" or "treasure" of useful impressions. It could 
make the mind, as of Ahasuerus in Hellas, 
. . . a chronicle 
Of strange and secret and forgotten things (133-4) 
t i l l , to the piercing glance of intelligence, 
. . . heaven's utmost deep 
Gives up her stars, and like a flock of sheep 
They pass before his eye, a ie numbered, and rol l on 
{Prometheus Unbound, IV, 418-20) 
or, as the Daemon in Calderón boasts, 
. . . in [his] wisdom are the orbs of Heaven 
Written as in a record; . . . 
(Magico Prodigioso, II, 162-3) 
And yet — herein, too, Shelley fully concurred with the 
view of his immediate predecessors — experience also dead-
ened and stultified, constricted and corrupted the conscious-
ness. It "binds us to be subjected to the accident of sur-
rounding impressions,"-" "blunt[ing] the discriminating 
powers of the mind" (in Wordsworth's phrase) 2 1 and (as 
Coleridge declared) 2 2 offering "no other counters to play 
with, but fixities and definites." Hence, the intellect 
fraught with experience could become, in the terms of 
Shelley's ambivalent image, " A book of blood, whence in a 
milder day / Men shall learn truth," 2 3 a register of shame 
wherein "Dark time . . . its evil legend wrought / In char-
acters of cloud which wither not,"2 4 "the book of fate" 
. . . dark with many a blazoned name 
O f misery - al l are mirrors of the same; 
But the dark fiend who with his iron pen 
Dipped in scorn's fiery poison, makes his fame 
E n d u r i n g there, would o'er the heads of men 
Pass harmless, if they scorned to make their hearts his den. 
(The Revolt of Islam, VIII, 3372-78) 
In Shelley's romantic view of experience, evil and misery 
— both inflicted and suffered — left their dark and indeli-
ble marks on the minds and faces of all they had touched. 
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I see the curse on gestures proud and cold, 
A n d looks of f irm defiance, and calm hate, 
A n d such despair as mocks itself with smiles, 
Writ ten as on a scroll: 
says Prometheus, inspecting the features of Jupiter's Phant-
asm;-5 for, as the Titan realizes with horror, in the state 
of untranscended experience (the hellish London of Blake 
and of Shelley-") the same lineaments of evil disfigure the 
faces both of victim and tyrant. They are visible in the 
Wandering Jew, the archetype of the sufferer, whose 
. . . port and mien bore mark of many years, 
A n d chronicles of untold ancientness 
Were legible within his beamless eye: 
(Queen Mab, VII, 73-5) 
and in Ozymandias, the archetype of the tyrant, 
. . . whose frown, 
A n d wrinkled lip, and sneer of cold command, 
Te l l that its sculptor well those passions read 
Which yet survive, stamped on these lifeless things, 
The hand that mocked them, and the heart that fed: . . . 
("Ozymandias," 4-8) 
Under the weight of reiterated impressions, man's moral 
nature sickens and withers into a moribund likeness of its 
own former self, a prisoner of its own bounded experience, 
and turned (as Shelley declares in The Cenci) into an im-
movable and insensitive 
. . . form, 
A rite, a law, a custom: not a man. 
(V, iv, 4-5) 
With "all the code of Custom's lawless law / Written upon 
the brows of old and young" (The Witch of Atlas, 493-4), 
morality becomes a "catalogue of sins" ("Fiordispina,"12), 
"tomes / Of reasoned wrong, glozed on by ignorance" (Pro-
metheus Unbound, III, iv, 166-7); "Religion Christless, God-
less — a book sealed" ("Sonnet: England in 1819," 11); 
conscience, a "stern, unflattering chronicler" (Queen Mab, 
I, 171), an "accuser" observing man's every act (The Cenci, 
II, i i , 120); Heaven, a legal "record" (Queen Mab, VII, 58) 
wherein the "decrees" of a vengeful, punitive God are "en-
registered" (The Cenci, II, i , 147) and where the curses of 
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men are "chronicled" for immediate execution (The Cenci, 
IV, i , 158-9); and the history of man's existence itself, 
ignominious annals on which "deadly power Has fixed its 
seal" of oppression, 
. . . the blood-stained charter of all woe, 
Which Nature soon, with re-creating hand, 
W i l l blot in mercy from the book of earth. 
{Queen Mab, VI , 48-9, 55-7) 
To sum up: the permanence of acquired experience, 
consistently associated in Shelley with the implements, 
processes and products of writing, came thus to be identi-
fied as the source of man's moral and intellectual self-en-
slavement. Experience was the nurse and süstainer of in-
spiration, and also, by an ironic inversion, the instrument 
of its extinction and death. Worse still, as Shelley knew 
only too well, the paradox had a particular application to 
the art of poetry, for poels themselves were unwitting ac-
cessories to the process whereby the vital impulse of inspi-
ration passed into the fixity of experience. Not only were 
"poets . . . the hierophants of an unapprehended inspira-
tion" for Shelley; they were also, in the closing phrase of 
his Defence, "the unacknowledged legislators of the world," 
who recorded and codified what they had apprehended. 
This was the basic ambivalence on which Shelley seized 
in his "Fragment on Keats," when, for once bringing into 
imaginative conjunction his two variants of Locke's tabula 
rasa, he wrote: "On Keats, who Desired that on his Tomb 
should be Inscribed — " 
'Here lieth One whose name was writ on water.' 
But, ere the breath that could erase it blew, 
Death, in remorse for that fell slaughter, 
Death, the immortal iz ing winter, flew 
Athwart the stream, — and time's printless 
torrent grew 
A scroll of crystal, blazoning the name 
Of Adonais! (1-7) 
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